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ABSTRACT
As of today, 5 people have been charged with manslaughter, among a total of 15 given
various other criminal charges as a result of the water crisis in Flint, Michigan. Using 334 files
downloaded from internal government documents and email conversations made publicly
available, this case study uses a qualitative content analysis to corroborate evidence behind the
Nick Lyon manslaughter charge in order to investigate in what ways the role of an organization
is contained behind a criminal charge imposed on a specific person. When studying the history
and series of events that led up to these convictions, an organizational structure supporting each
of these officials charged must be recognized to explain how this type of “crime” happened.
When a legal water switch results in killing over a dozen people, is it a concern for
criminologists? To understand crime as a construct, it should be operationalized according the
context being studied. Using green criminology and various literature, I examine how crime is or
is not operationalized. How do you hold a long strand of people’s actions accountable? This
framework assesses what I argue is the largest problematic component in this case: translating
criminal law to control dangerous environmental activities.

4
1. INTRODUCTION
Criminal prosecutions are to be delivered as a response to the worst offenses. When a
person representing an organization is criminally charged, on behalf of that identified
organization, it is an indication that a civil charge was not sufficient to repay the victims or
provide an equitable remedy without imposing criminal classifications (Greife et al. 2017). And
in white collar crime, manslaughter is the pinnacle of charge one can receive. In this instance,
criminal charges, however, are a gross representation of a larger event that happened. The
criminal prosecutions against the members charged in the Flint Water Crisis, specifically
regarding for the death of innocent people, do not account for the day-to-day actions that took
place leading up to the fatalities. The already marginalized population in Flint was harmfully
impacted by the human-induced decisions made regarding the water source switch and the
environmental consequences that came with it. A consistent theme in research about
environmental research shows that people of color or of low-income backgrounds are more
vulnerable and likely to be exposed to environmental dangers (Greife et al. 2017). The was
exactly the case for Flint, and understanding how the actors charged in this situation were able to
rationalize their behaviors in order to violate laws, rules, regulations, or norms is important to
highlight to explain how this catastrophe was permitted. The actions that took place in the
preceding months leading up to the deaths are relevant to tell the story of how the end results
were made possible.
Research Questions
When studying the history and series of events that led up to these convictions, an
organizational structure supporting each of these officials charged must be recognized to explain
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how this type of “crime” happened. These are some of the research questions I initially intended
to find the answers to, or a better explanation for:
•

Can the same characteristics of an organized criminal business or group apply to a
government agency?

•

Was this a result of organized crime, regardless of intention?

•

Can a series of actions taken by the government be considered a form of organized
crime? Do sociological theories of organized crime apply to this scenario?

However, after altering my question of interest to focus more specifically on the content, I intend
for my research to support the following:
•

When a legal water switch results in killing over a dozen people, is it a concern for
criminologists?

This helps bring in the perspective of green criminology. Further elaboration on this viewpoint
will be addressed.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Background
1a. Flint Water Crisis Overview
Flint, Michigan was one of many cities negatively impacted by de-industrialization in the
1970s, and has faced the lasting effects of financial struggles since. The city resides less than one
hundred miles away from the famous bodies of fresh water known as The Great Lakes. However,
this city has struggled for decades to have access to clean water. A history polluted with
automobile industries, emergency management, and racism has led to a persistence of injustice
that has invaded the lives of this population.
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In efforts to save money, the appointed emergency managers of the city, Darnell Early
and Ed Kurtz, made the decision to switch the city’s water source form Detroit to using the Flint
River in April of 2014. Although Detroit was providing safe and reliable water, Flint’s contract
with them was running out and the switch was intended to only be temporary until a long-term
decision of using Lake Huron through the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA) could be made.
What was not considered, however, was the contamination contained within water from the Flint
River that had long been a result of manufacturing companies dumping their waste during the
city’s flourishing times pre-industrialization. The tainted water was only the start of the health
problems that arose from the switch. The pipeline infrastructure in Flint, being used to transport
this water after filtered, was corroded and needed repairs. Lead in the pipes further contaminated
the water, due to improper treatment, and by the time it reached the Flint citizens’ homes it was
already life-threatening. Immediately following the switch in April of 2014, residents started
voicing their complaints. A brown color and foul odor were the first of the complaints. In the
following months, people started reporting incidences of rashes, hair loss, and fatigue. While
officials ignored these complaints, mistrust of the government from the community increased
and health issues worsened (Egan 2016).
In July of 2015, a report was leaked from the Environmental Protection Agency
indicating unsafe levels of lead present in Flint’s water. Soon after, children were tested for lead
in their blood and results indicated these levels had in fact significantly enlarged. In the
following months, a rise in legionnaires disease, caused by lead being in the blood, was
simultaneously happening- yet, officials still publicly claimed the water was safe to drink. After
the crisis had been in full effect, the government, supporting agencies, and officials in charge
agreed to switch back to Detroit in October of 2015 after admitting they had made a mistake. But
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the switch was already too late. By January of 2016, nine deaths had resulted since spring of
2014 due to legionnaires disease. Governor Rick Snyder of Michigan publicly released all emails
relating to the crisis shortly after, in efforts to take action in building back trust with the residents
of Flint (Egan 2016). With these available documents, my criminal investigation of the Flint
Water Crisis began.
1b. Flint Water Crisis from Victims’ Perspective
The following description is paraphrased from a letter drafted by NRDC’s (Natural
Resources Defense Council) litigation team explaining their intent to sue city officials in Flint
such as Governor Snyder and Dan Wyant due to failing to properly control the lead found in
Flint’s drinking water, found included within the email correspondence of my selected data set.
The purpose of this additional information regarding the background of the water crisis in Flint
helps provide a narrative from the viewpoint of the victims in this situation. It is important to
understand how the oppressed and plagued populations perceived the contextual background that
licensed these harmful decisions.
In fall of 2011, Governor Synder declared a financial state of emergency in Flint,
Michigan and appointed an emergency manager. For fifty years prior to this, the city had
purchased water from Lake Huron. But rising water rates from Detroit were not helping the
economically distressed town, so the City Council voted in March 2013 to join the KWA by
creating a new local water system. However, the city’s present contract with Detroit was not set
to expire until April of 2014, which was roughly eighteen months before the KWA pipeline was
predicted to be finished.
Instead of implementing a short-term drinking contract with the already established
system of Detroit for the transitional period, the emergency manager decided to switch to using
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the Flint River as the temporary water source. This was not a newly explored idea. In fact, it had
been investigated and denied in former considerations regarding water supply. The treatment
plant for the Flint River was outdated and would require around fifty million dollars of
innovations to have the water treated to meet federal standards. To engage in this switch required
approval from the MDEQ.
The MDEQ ratified the switch from Lake Huron in Detroit to the Flint River in April of
2014. The following twenty months were full of dangers and threats to the health of the city’s
citizens, causing them frustration and disgust with the local government officials who allowed
this to happen. For example, the problems resulting from the switch were so immediate that by
the summer of 2014 boil advisories were already being issued to residents, encouraging them to
boil their water before drinking, after the discovering of the presence of total coliform in the tap
water.
Unfortunately, this was only the start of their concerns. Because the Flint River had been
contaminated through a history of waste being dumped by the former General Motors plant in
the city, the water was highly corrosive and lead began to seep out of the pipes when transported,
subsequently into the drinking water. Control for this corrosiveness was not considered before
the switch and MDEQ did not require the implementation of such controls. The city used
reactive, as opposed to proactive, measures to address the lead level issues once residents
expressed their complaints and concerns.
After monitoring cycles were instituted, the EPA notified the DEQ of high lead levels
found in water samples in February 2015. Both city officials and the DEQ still maintained the
stance that these were isolate events with no correlation to the water switch or lack of corrosion
control in the pipes. The lack of instituting such vital measures ultimately resulted in over a
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dozen deaths. There was a significant increase in community action in July 2015 as residents
were still overwhelmingly concerned. Studies conducted by Virginia Tech and a local
pediatrician revealed elevated blood levels in children, yet the government still ensured the water
as safe and was hesitant to make any immediate public declarations. Finally, nearly seven
months after complaints had actively been voiced, the city recognized that these were serious
issues not to be ignored anymore and initiated the switch back to using Detroit water, completed
in October that same year. Altogether, these decisions endangered the lives of the public.
It is important to also note that the president declared the situation in Flint as a state of
emergency, rather than a disaster, because it did not meet the criteria of a federal disaster due to
the fact that it was a manmade crisis (Nukpezah 2017).
2. Criminal Charges
According to the Flint Water Advisory Task Force, top governmental agencies such as
the DEQ, DHHS, and EPA were all liable for this public health emergency (Nukpezah 2017).
Among several government officials, Director of Health and Human Services Nick Lyon was
charged with manslaughter relating to the crisis. Specifically, it was put forth by one of his coworkers that Lyon knew about the epidemic in January of 2015, but failed to publicly address it
until a year later. His failure to act on this knowledge has resulted in the deaths of over a dozen
people (2016a). Using the emails and supporting documents provided, a thorough investigation
will be conducted to see what communication, if any, was taking place during these time periods
of which imperative information was being withheld within his network.
Theoretical Framework
1. Defining Crime
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To understand crime as a construct, it should be operationalized according the context
being studied. Using various literature, it is important to understand how others define crime,
and/or how crime is not operationalized. From an outside view, we may choose to see it as an
individual crime because someone died from legionella, but what about everyone else negatively
affected and did not die-- does that mean the crime is not present as well? How do you hold a
long strand of people’s actions accountable? It can be hard to think beyond the individual level
but it is necessary, especially for the purpose of this project, to look at the organizational cultural
process.
2.. Traditional Criminology
The major difficulty approached when trying to understand the criminal implications of
how the Flint Water Crisis resulted in the deaths of many is how our society fundamentally
defines and interprets crime. Up until the attempted prosecutions of the Ford Motor Company
regarding the deaths that resulted from the car model Pinto, corporations had largely been
rejected criminal statutes due to the fact that a corporation is not an individual person, only on
paper (Boyes-Watson 2013: 340). One of the key elements necessary for an act to be prosecuted
as criminal is that the actor must possess the mens rea, or mindful intent, of committing a
specific action deemed as a crime. But, liability under the law holds that regardless of intent, the
committed act or omission of must be held accountable (White 2017). Because conventional
notions of violent crime involve an individual harming another individual, ways in which to
direct the blame to larger entities, such as government organizations, on a larger scale of analysis
is an aspect of crime that needs more explanation. Similar to the devastating situations that
resulted from the Ford Pinto model, the governing bodies of Flint chose to put profits ahead of
the lives of citizens in the community.
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Traditional criminology initially did not acknowledge crimes against the environment or
the environmental harm being dealt with in the changing world of living in a risk society. Rather
than directing a whole new theory towards this topic, the focus on a new “green perspective” as a
development of criminological theory must be addressed. A green perspective builds off the
principles outlined in traditional criminology, but fills in the gaps to include topics affecting and
referencing the type of dangerous culture we live in today (South and Beirne 2006: 429).
Issues, such as the examples described below through The Love Canal and The Toxic
Rim, and have in fact been covered within criminological literature, but have not been fully
deliberated enough to receive an entire field of study within the discipline until the introduction
of green criminology. In other words, the foundations have been put forth, but further emphasis
and analysis on issues encompassed within this subject must be added.
The Love Canal, a canal located near Niagara Falls, was a prominent chemical toxic
waste dump during the 1940s by a company called Hooker Chemical. After being covered up in
1952, the company later sold the surrounding land to the Niagara Falls Board of Education where
a school was eventually built. It was not until the late 1970s that the hazardous wastes began to
surface from the previously dedicated dumping site, and leaked into people’s properties and the
grounds of the school. The presence of eighty-eight chemicals were noted, eleven regarded as
possible carcinogens, others known to cause complications in the kidneys and liver. The amount
of media circulated around this event highlighted that this type of degradation of the environment
with negligence of future generations was not deemed a crime and was in fact legal (South and
Beirne 2006: 432).
When industrial developments began to boom in the early 1990’s, landfills of Southern
California were unable to contain the vast amounts of toxic waste generated. Rather than
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improvising to reduce the amount exerted, the city of Los Angeles chose to “regionalize” the
pollution- creating a Toxic Rim. The exportation of disposal to the regions of Baja California and
the Eastern Mojave Desert formed a waste-belt of colossal landfills that severely degraded the
environment, affecting ecological components including trees and delicate animal species. This
scenario represents an instance in which toxic waste was displaced in such a way to affect
victims largely hidden or forgotten when such harmful actions are taken against the environment,
and may not be acknowledged until a resulting catastrophe (South and Beirne 2006: 433-434).
Scholars in this field call for more research done by readers to apply a green field of
criminology to cases relevant within our own historical experiences. More recognition through
practical application is needed to enhance the development of such field. The work being
demonstrated in this project is thus envisioned to contribute knowledge to this area of interest.
3. Green Criminology
The intended field of significance utilized to support, defend, or perhaps even disprove
what is inferred from the data gathered is derived from green criminology. This framework
assesses what I argue is one of the largest problematic components in this case: translating
criminal law to control dangerous environmental activities. (South and Beirne 2006). Physical
individuals represent the subjects in question of criminal liability, but the unit of actor needed to
address environmental control is aimed at collective groups on the organizational level.
Green criminology is often regarded as a perspective, rather than a theory. The
examination of an environmental crime is limited when sought after as an experiment explained
by a law. But if the analysis of environmental crime expanded to include explanation, prediction,
and interpretation, the greater search for meaning behind environmental crimes can produce a
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more significant explanation, provided under a broader scope of green criminology (Brisman
2014).
Mainstream law and criminology do not provide the definition expansions crucial to encompass
the meanings of harm that are regarded by critical green criminologists (White and Heckenberg
2014).
“As the study of environmental victimology develops, it must be inclusive of different
notions of who is a victim, what is a victim and how the processes of denial (indifference,
oversight, ignorance) influence who and what is considered a victim, as well as the
impacts of these variables on the experience of victimization and suffering (e.g.
recognized or unrecognized; heard or unheard) and the meting out of justice in terms of
compensation (immediate, delayed, denied)”(White and Heckenberg 2014).
Green criminology is unique in providing a flexible framework by considering both legal and
illegal activities, over a length of time, and the harmful consequences done to both the
environment and human subjects (Greife et al. 2017). Research is needed to address these harms
on a larger, macro scale. Cases addressed through green criminology highlight that some
instances may violate supervisory laws, while others may include harms that are not explicitly
illegal but principally unacceptable from a social or moral standpoint. Nonetheless, both types
are not without public controversy and the risks associated with either are extensively debated
(South and Beirne 2006).
4. Neutralization Techniques
Among a list of other concepts and theoretical reasoning, the general category of
neutralization techniques and the examples below serves as one of the subfields that falls under
green criminology and that applies to this project. Neutralization techniques are a categorized
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form of action that explain why people choose to engage in norm-breaking behavior and
repeatedly do so, when in other contexts they are expected to respect the same governing norms.
These can justify the rationalizations of those norms which direct the activities within the public
sector. Neutralizing one’s behavior as a means of self-defense towards other dominating forces
may appear as a reasonable technique, but this view comes as a response to recognizing first that
whatever behavior they are participating in does not typically entertain the same interpretation
within the legal system. This theory was originally designed to explain juvenile delinquent
behavior. However, it has been argued that neutralizations may actually work better on
explaining the ex post facto behavior of older adults rather than younger people like it was
originally intended to do (Maruna and Copes 2005).
The behaviors engaged in perhaps did not register as “criminal” when they were doing
so; it took a buildup of actions to make it more evident. The idea is that understanding the
background behind an offender or offenders will help provide explanation for the reasoning they
engaged in acts legally defined as criminal. Because of the context and crisis situation happening
in Flint, it was easy for the members of the government involved to learn and apply these types
of neutralization techniques without actually trying to or putting forth much effort.
Simultaneously, it was also the ideal setting for them to not be met with any consequences.
This theory is one of the earliest theories that accounted for deviant behavior. Although
originally intended to explain juvenile delinquent behaviors, it has evolved to be used for
organizational and white-collar crime as well. Maruna and Copes (2005) state, “Neutralization
theory transcends the realm of criminology… Thus, neutralization theory has ‘universal
applicability,’ as it can be applied to any situation where there are inconsistencies between one’s
actions and one’s beliefs.” Later concepts placed the emphasis on the central inconsistency factor
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of neutralization theory: the divergence between being self-recognized as a moral person and
acting in ways that are contradictory to the acclaimed principles.
In terms of the research described in the topic of my study, this idea of rationalizing the
differences conveyed between one’s beliefs and actions is especially relevant due to the basis
that the government is designed to explicitly define both. We are socialized to expect that the
government’s function is to do whatever is best for the people it is representing (Maruna and
Copes 2005). The idea is that in order to engage in criminal behavior, the actor must find ways to
justify its necessity to reduce guilt.
Understanding the principles behind denial involves examining how the agents were able
to rationalize their wrong-doing. These assorted techniques of neutralization show how state
leaders make efforts to avoid taking the proper actions necessary for environmental problems
while dynamically supporting the interests of particular sectors (White and Heckenberg 2014).
These denials can be categorized by the following:
1. Denial of responsibility
2. Denial of injury
3. Denial of victim
4. Condemnation of the condemners
5. Appeal to higher loyalties
Denial of responsibility includes instances where the deviant acts may not only be considered
accidental, but also the fault of someone else or forces outside of the actor’s control. An example
of this could be, “I didn’t mean to do it,” or “This was just an accident” (Sykes and Matza 1957).
Denial of injury holds that the wrongfulness of one’s behavior might be against a certain set of
rules or guidelines, but the actor believes this decision will not cause any great harm. Particularly
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in environmental crimes, it is a common theme that the perpetrators claim there is no direct
victim. Therefore, this technique is susceptible to a variety of interpretations and is closely linked
with the technique of denial of victim. Denial of victim happens when it is stated that some
victims acted wrongfully and therefore deserve whatever happened to them (Maruna and Copes
2005). It also includes when the victim is absent, not known, or more obscure. This denial of
existence of a victim leads to the underlying belief that the injury acclaimed to the victim is more
of a punishment or retaliation for some other instance. Especially in instances when
consciousness of the victim is reduced, this rationalization process can be set in motion. The
fourth technique, condemnation of the condemners, can also be translated as “rejection of the
rejectors” (Sykes and Matza 1957). Those who disapprove of the violator’s actions are instead
attacked and blamed by the perpetrator to shift the narrative away from the victim’s accusation
against one’s wrongful doing in order to justify their behaviors. Examples could include calling
someone a hypocrite or a criminal themselves. The final rationalization, appeal to higher
loyalties, contains verbiage and reasoning that the norms broken were not selfishly decided but
were enacted to serve the interests of a greater group or organization. For instance, “I didn’t do it
for myself” (Sykes and Matza 1957). The remaining outcome from each of these techniques is
the lack of action to address the key influences contributing to the environmental problem
recognized (White and Heckenberg 2014). Specifically, for this study, the environmental
problem of lead poising is of focus.
3. METHODOLOGY
Because this project focuses on studying a harmful event that has already happened,
analyzing the documents of which have been selected and provided are appropriate for
rebuilding, mapping out, and displaying the factors that coalesced to institute the problem. The
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data source of documents is important in examining environmental harm through instances of
email correspondence, memos, minutes scribed during meetings, and letters; all of which were
components used in this discourse analysis (White and Heckenberg 2014). This study was made
possible through approval from the University of Tennessee’s Institutional Review Board, which
served as the reason I was able to access this data and permitted to do research on this topic. IRB
approval was sought in June of 2017 and was received on October 2, 2017.
Obtaining Dataset
The primary dataset used in this project was obtained from publicly available documents.
The administration operating under Governor Rick Snyder of Michigan released all emails
relating to the Flint Water Crisis in January of 2016, in hopes of restoring trust with the citizens
of Michigan through a supposed act of transparency. Additionally, the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality (MDEQ) made similar emails of relevant material available to the public
through a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) by Professor Marc Edwards at
Virginia Tech in 2015. Both sets of emails were published to Gov. Snyder’s website, but were
paradoxically difficult to both find and access. A fellow undergraduate researcher, Haley Boles,
was able to uncover the first set of files, and with the help and training from Rochelle Butler of
the University’s Information Technology department, a second set was discovered.
Once all files were downloaded, a team of researchers began to examine the content.
However, because these files were transported in the original format, they only represented flat
images, meaning they were not organized in any structure and the documents were not text
searchable. The files each correlated to a different government entity, such as the MDEQ or
DHHS (Department of Health and Human Services), and varied in sizes. Some departments also
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corresponded with multiple files, and the PDFs enclosed could range from a couple pages to
estimations of hundred-thousands.
To organize the data set, Haley started by utilizing the professional version of Adobe
Acrobat Reader to address the issue of making the files text-searchable. This program contains a
feature called “optical character recognition” (OCR) that has the ability to scan documents for
letters and words, and upon identification, overlays the uncovered data on top of the original
image. Depending on the file size, Adobe is only able to handle increments of 5-10 files. This
process proved to be time consuming given the large data set considered, and although this
process may not guarantee perfect results, the OCR function aided in creating a more accessible
data set.
Once the files were successfully completed through OCR, they then had to be separated
into smaller units to make the documents organized and manageable. Bates numbers, or page
numbers, were added to each massive PDF, then were split into multiple sections. The
documents were divided based on already existing forms of bookmarks, which were likely
instituted during the initial email extraction process. To keep the distinctive email conversation
threads in-tact, the content size and number of pages within each bookmark is not standardized
by a certain number of pages. They were split into parts and put into folders labeled by the title
of the original file names. Documents ranged from including 5 to 1,000s of parts, comprising a
total 27.6 GB of data once all processed. These were then all uploaded into a shared Google
Drive master folder, where individuals from the research group could access and search for
specific files containing particular names, dates, or other key words.
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Sample Selection
For my case selection, I did a text search on the google drive folder for all documents
containing the name “Nick Lyon,” and compiled each piece into a separate folder. I then
downloaded the folder into Nvivo, where I coded separately each of the 334 files mentioning
Nick Lyon. This amounted to being 270.2 megabytes of data. Some of the files were duplicates,
some were only a page or two, some were over a hundred pages in length. A large and broad data
set was needed in order to support my specific argument that utilized discourse analysis methods.
Any further condensing of the data set would almost be too narrow (i.e. documents from just one
week or a couple of days) to defend my argument that the actions were taking place over a long
period of time before the public was properly addressed. Therefore, I went back through each file
in my Nvivo project and organized them into categories based on the month they corresponded
with. Doing this subsequently showed me which months had drastically more communication
than others, which was also beneficial for later references. Using an already made Flint timeline
our group has been collaborating on over the past year, I was able to match up the
communications from the categorized emails per month with what was happening at that time in
the public sphere. This strategy was created to produce results that would correspond with
neutralizations, while still initially focusing in on 1 of the 5 sectors involved in the criminal
charges.
Coding Scheme
Using a grounded theory coding scheme by Kathy Charmaz, I started my focus on initial
coding, which is one of two given types: initial and focused coding. Initial coding entails coding
line by line and focusing strictly on each segment, gathering data, then forming analytical
questions for theoretical research from what has been found (Charmaz 2006). This scheme also
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validates an objective coding viewpoint. Regardless of what the intention behind the message
was, the language is still present. Open coding was used to group raw data based on concepts,
such as neutralization techniques or objective terms like financial costs and background
information. Once classified, they were sorted to correspond with the literature relevant to make
sense of the empirical evidence.
Due to the extent of the data set, I organized the files into separate folders in Nvivo based
on the month the email correspondence took place during. The earliest available month was
March of 2013, and the most recent month available was February 2016. There were thirteen
documents where the time period was unavailable or unknown, either due to being only partial
document fragments or a document, such as meeting minutes, that was undated. This
organization method aided in being able to confront the data systematically while following the
timeline of events.
Upon decision of focusing on neutralization techniques as the primary theoretical
framework to support my argument, the codes I created to correspond with the given data set
were simplified into the five direct categories of neutralizations. The following discussion
section will go future in-depth as to the various concepts contained in each code and the
terminology that was discovered throughout my analysis of which fell into these categories.
4. DISCUSSION
It is possible that the indications of these techniques could represent the working
environments of the people being referenced. Given the results, it did not take one person to
cause the process that killed innocent people; it required a system of actions working together.
“Neutralizations, then, may say more about a culture than about an individual” (Maruna and
Copes 2005). A criminal charge or the death of a citizen does not provide a justification for the
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day-to-day actions that took place before the lives were lost. In an article where a reporter
interviewed a resident, she stated, “They cut every corner… They did more to cover up than
actually fix it. That’s criminal” (2016b). In the perspective of the perpetrators, the decision to
switch water sources and inadequately treat the alternative source properly should be excused
because the outcomes of death were unpredictable and the necessary steps needed were unknown
at the time. But these exact circumstances provide why the inability of these events as
foreseeable situate the context to be reckless because it was not initially proven safe (South and
Beirne 2006). If the interest of humans’ well-being were to be present at the forefront of
decisions made by agents of control, as opposed to economic or other interests, the margin for
error could be significantly reduced.
Results/Implications
Neutralization techniques are one way of claiming victimhood. Through the analysis of
the emails, it was a common theme for the actor to articulate some type of excuse for why the
situation was worsening. The criminal impositions, on those who were found most liable, have
the power to raise public awareness about the importance of accountability when being in charge
of a large expansion of individuals (Gostin 2016). The rationalization, denial of responsibility,
was the most common technique identified in the data set. Actors from all agencies and positions
were included in this category. One excuse that repetitively was used throughout these internal
communications was the denial of responsibility through the lack of knowledge or placing the
responsibility on someone else. Ignorance and lack of knowledge about the law is not an excuse
or defense against the reasoning for committing an illegal environmental offense (Gaynor,
Remer and Bartman 1992). Similarly, criminal penalties are applicable for acts of negligence.
“As the courts have interpreted the environmental statutes, knowledge of the law is generally not
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required to sustain a criminal conviction” (Gaynor, Remer and Bartman 1992). Lack of proper
knowledge of how to deal with the water issues does not make one exempt from blame,
especially in environmental crimes. The ignorance still makes the perpetrator subject to criminal
accusations for not operating as the informed professional they are held liable to be.
Shift of blame is another subcategory found prevalent throughout the documents. Scholars argue
that this could fall under the category of condemnation of condemners, but I argue that this limits
its applicability to blaming only those that are coming forth about the issue as victims, rather
than also including other agencies that are subject to blame (South and Biernes 2006). For this
reason, indications of an actor or group of actors stating that the blame should be on a different
governing organization fell into the category of denial of responsibility. This sector held the most
content collected. Overall, “the Flint independent task force makes clear that the system failed to
protect and respect the rights and health of the people of Flint at every level” (Gostin 2016). All
sectors were involved in the formation of this harmful string of events; the single text search of
Nick Lyon only expanded my knowledge of how the interworking of all the agencies were
actually the ones responsible, not solely Lyon, and how the criminal law statues are not designed
to target or control these extentions of people.
Denial of victim and condemnation of condemners were the other most noted codes
discovered. Denial of victim is another way of saying that the subject who complained is an
agent of harm, not really a victim. As indicated in the charts below, these common references
took place when the actor would blame the lead problem on a victim’s plumbing infrastructure
structure, rather than the actual improper treatment taking place of the water leaving the facility.
Rather than the victim being absent or unknown, I would also argue to include the definition of
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this particular technique to include if the victim is largely perceived as marginalized or invisible
from the public scope.
The chart and image below highlight some of the most descriptive codes for each sector
of neutralization techniques found. Not that appeal to higher loyalties was not as prevalent in the
findings, perhaps due to requests for informal communications (phone call, quick meeting, etc.)
that took place in the emails between different departments. These instances could have been
where an actor defended themselves by stating they were doing it for the betterment of their
organization or similar rationalizations.
Denial of responsibility
deq19_Part002

deq19_Part2

deq19_Part002

deq19_Part002

deq4_Part578(1)

“Simply stated, staff employed a federal protocol they
believed was appropriate and it was not. However, I am
convinced our program staff believed they were doing their
job correctly, and simply did not have the experience with
the particular issue of corrosion control in cities of more
than 50,000 people” (DEQ director Dan Wyant sent to
colleagues 10/15/15)
“Let’s be clear: The Flint River is not contributing lead. The
water leaving the drinking water plant is clean and safe. The
water traveling through the distribution system is also free
of lead. The lead issues are the result of water in homes that
have lead service lines or lead plumbing. And because the
contamination factor is at the homeowner level, it is
difficult to track or asses with the kind of specificity
customers would like to think regulators have” (rebuttal
editorial to the Free Press by DEQ Brad Warfel 10/1/15)
“I appreciate the council voting the way they did, but even
more than that, I am glad the residents of Flint were able to
have their voices heard via their elected officials” (CEO of
KWA Jeff Wright statement 3/26/13)
“The issues around Flint’s drinking water represent the
challenges of aging infrastructure” (DEQ Dan Wyant
Taking Action on Flint Water draft sent to DEQ Mary Beth
Thelen 12/28/15)
“I just received a call from LeeAnn Walters’ home in Flint.
She had her water tested again—this time the lead levels
came back at 397 ppd. I will ask her to fax me the official
lab results she has. Are you aware if the City flushed her
system after the last test? Any thoughts on how to respond
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to her? I’m running out of ideas” (EPA Jennifer Crookes to
DEQ employees 3/18/15)
Staff_17_Part315

“’The city was doing the best it could’ to clean up
pollutants, Edwards said, but added that corrosivity was
inevitable. He blamed the problems on a lack of expertise
rather than intentional wrongdoing. ‘I think it started
relatively innocently. They didn’t understand testing and
they didn’t understand corrosivity,’ he said” (article
circulated written by Detroit Free Press 10/11/15)

deq4_Part578 (City of Flint 2015, 3rd Quarter Water Quality Report under section titled: Current
Drinking Water Issues & Lead Information)

Denial of victim
deq19_Part2

deq4_Part578(1)

Denial of injury
deq19_Part002

deq4_Part578(1)

“Lead plumbing is common in homes built prior to 1986,
and anyone in the state with lead pipes in their home can
take some extra precautions to minimize lead in their
drinking water” (Flint Water Action Plan Talking Points,
10/1/15)
“It’s a very sore point, particularly when you have a
population with a high degree of low-income folks…To me,
the conversation we need to be having is, how do we lower
those rates?” (Flint’s appointed emergency manager Gerald
Ambrose 3/24/15)

“Though aware of the Virginia Tech sampling results,
MDEQ officials continued to insist that Flint’s water was
safe to drink” (Letter of intent to sue from ACLU
11/16/2015)
“We don’t believe our data demonstrates an increase in
leading poisoning rates that may be attributable to the
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change in water source for Flint” (DHHS internal memo
from Nancy Peeler 7/29/15)
Condemnation of the Condemners
deq4_Part578(1)
“Let me tell you, this Flint situation is a nasty issue—I’ve
had people call me 4 letter words over the phone, yell at me,
and call me a crook—yes, the last one was a play on my last
name—I didn’t think it was funny, though I am developing
thick skin ☺” (EPA Jennifer Crooks sent to EPA Program
Analyst Rhiannon Dee 2/6/15)
deq4_Part578
“Yep, have another Flint complaint” (EPA Jennifer Crooks
sent to DEQ members 9/17/14)
deq4_Part578
“Yep, another complaint about our favorite water supply ☺”
(DEQ Jennifer Crooks to Stephen Busch DEQ 10/2/14)
deq4_Part578
“The technical information matters for transparency but the
trust gap is so wide that most people will be skeptical of all
of it” (Andy Leavitt response to Howard Croft regarding 3rd
Quarter Water Report 10/11/15)
deq19_Part002
“Moreover, the City’s efforts to test for lead involve
sending water sampling kits to homeowners and relying on
them to participate and follow the sampling instructions,
and that has been a long-standing challenge in Flint”
(rebuttal editorial to the Free Press by DEQ Brad Warfel
10/1/15)

Appeal to higher loyalties
deq4_Part578(1)

deq19_Part001

“Flint was within federal protocols when it chose to use
lime, and this is consistent with what every other
community was required to do” (Notes prepared for DEQ
Flint Water Drinking Q&A 9/30/15)
“I cannot imagine that any decisions made that contributed
to the crisis were made by this Director, but rather they
were certainly made within the division, because at the time
they seemed like less important, lower-level decisions”
(DEQ Bruce VanOtteren send to Governor Snyder
regarding keeping Dan Wyant as DEQ director 12/29/15)

Limitations
The main limitations in this study were with organizing data set and the lack of computer
science technology able to be utilized. More information could be produced and processed if a
computer was dedicated to this data and a software or database was designed to properly arrange
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each of the files. It would have been more representative if it was possible or better accessible to
narrow down the dates of DHHS, or if I had time to select a new data set that was smaller and
more precise to these ramifications. Accuracy could have been improved if data set was smaller.
The unpredictability of each file size was not an explicit limitation, but an adjustment that could
be better accounted for in the future with more advanced or detailed technology that could
provide descriptions of each file size and length. Having the ability to do specific text search of
certain terms in the documents could also minimize time spent looking through each one.
Future Research
It could be beneficial to perform more legal research or expertise, of which I am not well
versed in, on how the law has treated cases like these in the past and what the future predictions
might be for those charged in the Flint Water Crisis. A continued following of the criminal
prosecutions and developments made in that area would be a different area that could aid to the
importance of this project: a more specific investigation of responsibility. Maruna and Copes
might classify this entire operation as a, “systematic study of mass violence” (Maruna and Copes
2005). Doing so opens up avenues for more research directed at similar instances and how, if
any, this could be considered a case of mass violence. It would also be interesting to research and
record what efforts are being made to restore trust between the community and the government,
if any. My project focused heavily on actions taken before the catastrophe happened, so it would
be an interesting comparative approach to discuss the efforts made after and more recently to
restore communal trust. A reparative justice alternative, such as community service, as opposed
to the typical sanctioning consequences of jail time or financial obligations, could be proposed as
a better way to aid in this community development proposition (White 2017). Exploring ways
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this could be performed and presenting it to legal representatives could have an effect on how the
community of Flint will regard the officials in charge of their well-being in the future.
Conclusion
After going through and coding each document, I was overall very surprised with the
results I found. Expecting to find a trail behind Nick Lyon and the rest of DHHS talking about
the health issues that have resulted from the water switch, I hardly found any indications at all of
his involvement. It was difficult to find anything that he could have been linked to, other than
being copied in an email thread sent to multiple people. Instead, much of the discussion in the
emails indicated that DEQ was ultimately be blamed for the negative aftermath that came from
the water switch. Neutralization techniques, such as denial of responsibility, have uncovered
these findings. Seeing how the combination of multiple organizations can be responsible for such
a devastating series of events was a common theme recognized throughout this study, as opposed
to how one actor did all the damage. Ways in which the various actors chose to shift the blame
on someone else, a factor that they had no control over, or the victim who was voicing the
complaint were all ways in which the people held responsible and liable for the issues that arose
from the water crisis chose to justify the negligent actions taken that led to the deaths of one too
many. In the end, there are never any safe levels of lead, and finding loopholes to invalidate this
statement were ways government officials and directors toyed with innocent citizens’ lives.
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